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Abstract. While symmetric-key steganography is quite well understood
both in the information-theoretic and in the computational setting, many
fundamental questions about its public-key counterpart resist persis-
tent attempts to solve them. The computational model for public-key
steganography was proposed by von Ahn and Hopper in EUROCRYPT 2004.
At TCC 2005, Backes and Cachin gave the first universal public-key
stegosystem – i. e. one that works on all channels – achieving security
against replayable chosen-covertext attacks (SS-RCCA) and asked whether
security against non-replayable chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) is achiev-
able. Later, Hopper (ICALP 2005) provided such a stegosystem for every
efficiently sampleable channel, but did not achieve universality. He posed
the question whether universality and SS-CCA-security can be achieved si-
multaneously. No progress on this question has been achieved since more
than a decade. In our work we solve Hopper’s problem in a somehow com-
plete manner: As our main positive result we design an SS-CCA-secure
stegosystem that works for every memoryless channel. On the other hand,
we prove that this result is the best possible in the context of universal
steganography. We provide a family of 0-memoryless channels – where
the already sent documents have only marginal influence on the current
distribution – and prove that no SS-CCA-secure steganography for this
family exists in the standard non-look-ahead model.
1 Introduction
Steganography is the art of hiding the transmission of information to achieve
secret communication without revealing its presence. In the basic setting, the
aim of the steganographic encoder (often called Alice or the stegoencoder) is to
hide a secret message in a document and to send it to the stegodecoder (Bob)
via a public channel which is completely monitored by an adversary (Warden or
steganalyst). The channel is modeled as a probability distribution of legal doc-
uments, called covertexts, and the adversary’s task is to distinguish those from
altered ones, called stegotexts. Although strongly connected with cryptographic
encryption, steganography is not encryption: While encryption only tries to hide
the content of the transmitted message, steganography aims to hide both the
message and the fact that a message was transmitted at all.
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As in the cryptographic setting, the security of the stegosystems should only
rely on the secrecy of the keys used by the system. Symmetric-key steganography,
which assumes that Alice and Bob share a secret-key, has been a subject of
intensive study both in an information-theoretic [7,36,40] and in a computational
setting [13,22,23,25,26,30]. A drawback of such an approach is that the encoder
and the decoder must have shared a key in a secure way. This may be unhandy,
e. g. if the encoder communicates with several parties.
In order to avoid this problem in cryptography, Diffie and Hellman provided
the notion of a public-key scenario in their groundbreaking work [15]. This idea
has proved to be very useful and is currently used in nearly every cryptographic
application. Over time, the notion of security against so-called chosen ciphertext
attacks (chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA)-security) has established itself as the
“gold standard” for security in the public-key scenario [20,27]. In this setting,
an attacker has also access to a decoding oracle that decodes every ciphertext
different from the challenge-text. Dolev, Dwork and Naor [16] proved that the
simplest assumption for public-key cryptography – the existence of trapdoor
permutations – is sufficient to construct a CCA-secure public key cryptosystem.
Somewhat in contrast to the research in cryptographic encryption, only very
little studies in steganography have been concerned so far within the public-key
setting. Von Ahn and Hopper [38,39] were the first to give a formal framework
and to prove that secure public-key steganography exists. They formalized secu-
rity against a passive adversary in which Warden is allowed to provide challenge-
hiddentexts to Alice in hopes of distinguishing covertexts from stegotexts encod-
ing the hiddentext of his choice. For a restricted model, they also defined security
against an active adversary; It is assumed, however, that Bob must know the
identity of Alice, which deviates from the common bare public-key scenario.
Importantly, the schemes provided in [38,39] are universal (called also black-
box in the literature). This property guarantees that the systems are secure with
respect not only to a concrete channel C but to a broad range of channels. The
importance of universality is based on the fact that typically no good description
of the distribution of a channel is known.
In [3], Backes and Cachin provided a notion of security for public-key stegano-
graphy with active attacks, called steganographic chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCAs).
In this scenario the warden may provide a challenge-hiddentext to Alice and en-
force the stegoencoder to send stegotexts encoding the hiddentext of his choice.
The warden may then insert documents into the channel between Alice and Bob
and observe Bob’s responses in hope of detecting the steganographic communica-
tion. This is the steganographic equivalent of a chosen ciphertext attack against
encryption and it seems to be the most general type of security for public-key
steganography with active attacks similar to CCA-security in encryption. Backes
and Cachin also gave a universal public-key stegosystem which, although not
secure in the general SS-CCA-setting, satisfies a relaxed notion called stegano-
graphic security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-covertext
attacks (steganographic replayable chosen-covertext attack (SS-RCCA)) inspired
by the work of Canetti et al. [8]. In this relaxed setting, the warden may still
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provide a hiddentext to Alice and is allowed to insert documents into the channel
between Alice and Bob but with the restriction that the warden’s document does
not encode the chosen hiddentext. Backes and Cachin left as an open problem
if secure public-key steganography exists at all in the SS-CCA-framework.
This question was answered by Hopper [21] in the affirmative in case Al-
ice and Bob communicate via an efficiently sampleable channel C. He proved
(under the assumption of a CCA-secure cryptosystem) that for every such chan-
nel C there is an SS-CCA-secure stegosystem PKStSC on C. The system clev-
erly “derandomizes” sampling documents by using the sampling-algorithm of
the channel and using a pseudorandom generator to deterministically embed the
encrypted message. Hence, PKStSC is only secure on the single channel C and
is thus not universal. Hopper [21] posed as a challenging open problem to show
the (non)existence of a universal SS-CCA-secure stegosystem. Since more than
a decade, public key steganography has been used as a tool in different con-
texts (e. g. broadcast steganography [17] and private computation [9,11]), but
this fundamental question remained open.
We solve Hopper’s problem in a complete manner by proving (under the
assumption of the existence of doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations and
collision-resistant hash functions) the existence of an SS-CCA-secure public key
stegosystem that works for every memoryless channel, i. e. such that the docu-
ments are independently distributed (for a formal definition see next section). On
the other hand, we also prove that the influence of the history – the already sent
documents – dramatically limits the security of stegosystems in the realistic non-
look-ahead model: We show that no stegosystem can be SS-CCA-secure against
all 0-memoryless channels in the non-look-ahead model. In these channels, the
influence of the history is minimal. We thereby demonstrate a clear dichotomy
result for universal public-key steganography: While memoryless channels do
exhibit an SS-CCA-secure stegosystem, the introduction of the history prevents
this kind of security.
Our Contribution. As noted above, the stegosystem of Backes and Cachin
has the drawback that it achieves a weaker security than SS-CCA-security while
it works on every channel [3]. On the other hand, the stegosystem of Hopper
achieves SS-CCA-security but is specialized to a single channel [21]. We prove
(under the assumption of the existence of doubly-enhanced trapdoor permuta-
tions and collision-resistant hash functions) that there is a stegosystem that is
SS-CCA-secure on a large class of channels (namely the memoryless ones). The
main technical novelty is a method to generate covertexts for the message m
such that finding a second sequence of covertexts that encodes m is hard. Hop-
per achieves this at the cost of the universality of his system, while we still allow
a very large class of channels. We thereby answer the question of Hopper in the
affirmative, in case of memoryless channels. Note that before this work, it was
not even known whether an SS-CCA-secure stegosystem exists that works for
some class of channels (Hopper’s system only works on a single channel that is
hard-wired into the system). Furthermore, we prove that SS-CCA-security for
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memoryless channels is the best possible in a very natural model: If the history
influences the channel distribution in a minor way, i. e. only by its length, we
prove that SS-CCA-security is not achievable in the standard non-look-ahead
model of von Ahn and Hopper. In Table 1, we compare our results with previous
works.
Table 1. Comparison of the public-key stegosystems
Paper Security Channels Applicability
von Ahn and Hopper [38] passive universal possible
Backes and Cachin [3] SS-RCCA universal possible
Hopper [21] SS-CCA single constr. channel possible
This work (Theorem 10) SS-CCA all memoryless channels possible
This work (Theorem 12) SS-CCA universal impossible*
* In the non-look-ahead model against non-uniform wardens.
Related Results. Anderson and Petitcolas [1] and Craver [12], have both, even
before the publication of the work by von Ahn and Hopper [38,39], described
ideas for public-key steganography, however, with only heuristic arguments for
security. Van Le and Kurosawa [28] showed that every efficiently sampleable chan-
nel has an SS-CCA-secure public-key stegosystem. A description of the channel
is built into the stegosystem and it makes use of a pseudo-random generator
G that encoder and decoder share. But the authors make a strong assumption
concerning changes of internal states of G each time the embedding operation
is performed, which does not fit into the usual models of cryptography and
steganography. Lysyanskaya and Meyerovich [32] investigated the influence of
the sampling oracle on the security of public key stegosystems with passive at-
tackers. They prove that the stegosystem of von Ahn and Hopper [39] becomes
insecure if the approximation of the channel distribution by the sampling oracle
deviates only slightly from the correct distribution. They also construct a chan-
nel, where no incorrect approximation of the channel yields a secure stegosystem.
This strengthens the need for universal stegosystems, as even tiny approxima-
tion errors of the channel distribution may lead to huge changes with regard to
the security of the system. Fazio, Nicolosi and Perera [17] extended public-key
steganography to the multi-recipient setting, where a single sender communi-
cates with a dynamically set of receivers. Their system is designed such that no
outside party and no unauthorized user is able to detect the presence of these
broadcast communication. Cho, Dachma-Soled and Jarecki [11] upgraded the
covert multi-party computation model of Chandran et al. [9] to the concurrent
case and gave protocols for several fundamental operations, e. g. string equality
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and set intersection. Their steganographic (or covert) protocols are based upon
the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions and
notations. In Section 3, we give an example attack on the stegosystem of Backes
and Cachin to highlight the differences between SS-RCCA-security and SS-CCA-
security. The following Section 4 contains a high-level view of our construction.
Section 5 uses the results of [21] to prove that one can construct cryptosystems
with ciphertexts that are indistinguishable from a distribution on bitstrings re-
lated to the hypergeometric distribution, which we will need later on. The main
core of our protocol is an algorithm to order the documents in an undetectable
way that still allows us to transfer information. This ordering is described in Sec-
tion 6. Our results concerning the existence of SS-CCA-secure steganography for
every memoryless channel are then presented and proved in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 contains the impossibility result for SS-CCA-secure stegosystems in the
non-look-ahead model on 0-memoryless channels.
In order to improve the presentation, we moved proofs of some technical
statements to the appendix.
2 Definitions and Notation
If S is a finite set, we write x և S to denote the random assignment of a
uniformly chosen element of S to x. If A is a probability distribution or a ran-
domized algorithm, we write x ← A to denote the assignment of the output of
A, taken over the internal coin-flips of A.
As our cryptographic and steganographic primitives will be parameterized
by the key length κ, we want that the ability of any polynomial algorithm to
attack this primitives is lower than the inverse of all polynomials in κ. This is
modeled by the definition of a negligible function. A function negl : N → [0, 1]
is called negligible, if for every polynomial p, there is an N0 ∈ N such that
negl(N) < p(N)−1 for everyN ≥ N0. For a probability distributionD on support
X , the min-entropy H∞(D) is defined as infx∈X{− logD(x)}.
We also need the notion of a strongly 2-universal hash function, which is a
set of functions G mapping bitstrings of length ℓ to bitstrings of length ℓ′ < ℓ
such that for all x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ with x 6= x′ and all (not necessarily different)
y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
′
, we have |{f ∈ G | f(x) = y ∧ f(x′) = y′}| = |G|
22ℓ′
. If ℓ/ℓ′ ∈ N, a
typical example of such a family is the set of functions
{x 7→
(∑ℓ/ℓ′
i=1 aixi + b
)
mod 2ℓ
′
| a1, . . . , aℓ/ℓ′ , b ∈ {0, . . . , 2
ℓ′ − 1} },
where xi denotes the i-th block of length ℓ
′ of x and we implicitly use the
canonical bijection between {0, 1}n and the finite field {0, . . . , 2n−1}. See e. g. the
textbook of Mitzenmacher and Upfal [33] for more information on this. For two
polynomials ℓ and ℓ′, a strongly 2-universal hash family is a family G = {Gκ}κ∈N
such that every Gκ is a strongly 2-universal hash function mapping strings of
length ℓ(κ) to strings of length ℓ′(κ).
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Channels and Stegosystems. In order to be able to embed messages into
unsuspicious communication, we first need to provide a definition for this. We
model the communication as an unidirectional transfer of documents that we will
treat as strings of length n over a constant-size alphabet Σ. The communication
is defined via the concept of a channel C on Σ: A function, that maps, for
every n ∈ N, a history hist ∈ (Σn)∗ to a probability distribution on Σn. We
denote this probability distribution by Chist,n and its min-entropy H∞(C, n) as
minhist{H∞(Chist,n)}.
Definition 1. We say that a channel C is memoryless, if Chist,n = Chist′,n for all
hist, hist′, i. e. if the history has no effect on the channel distribution.
Note the difference between memoryless and 0-memoryless channels of Lysyan-
skaya and Meyerovich [32], where only the length of the history has an influence
on the channel, since the channel distributions are described by the use of mem-
oryless Markov chains :
Definition 2 ([32]). A channel C is 0-memoryless, if Chist,n = Chist′,n for all
hist, hist′ such that | hist | = | hist′ |.
A stegosystem PKStS tries to embed messages of length PKStS.ml into PKStS.ol
documents of the channel C that each have size PKStS.dl, such that this se-
quence is indistinguishable from a sequence of typical documents. A public-key
stegosystem PKStS with message length PKStS.ml : N → N, document length
PKStS.dl : N→ N, and output length PKStS.ol : N→ N (all functions of the secu-
rity parameter κ) is a triple of polynomial probabilistic Turing machines (PPTMs)
[PKStS.Gen,PKStS.Enc,PKStS.Dec]3 with the functionalities:
– The key generation Gen on input 1κ produces a pair (pk, sk) consisting of a
public key pk and a secret key sk (we assume that sk also fully contains pk).
– The encoding algorithm Enc takes as input the public key pk, a message m ∈
{0, 1}ml(κ), a history hist ∈ (Σdl(κ))∗ and some state information s ∈ {0, 1}∗
and produces a document d ∈ Σdl(κ) and state information s′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ by
being able to sample from Chist,dl(κ). By Enc
C(pk,m, hist), we denote the com-
plete output of ol(κ) documents one by one. Note that generally, the encoder
needs to decide upon document di before it is able to get samples for the
(i+ 1)-th document, as in the secret-key model of Hopper et al. [23, Section
2, “channel access”] and the public-key model of von Ahn and Hopper [38,39,
Section 3]. This captures the notion that an attacker should have as much in-
formation as possible while the stegosystem is not able to look-ahead into the
future. To highlight this restriction, we call this model the non-look-ahead
model. Note that this is no restriction for memoryless channels.
– The decoding algorithm Dec takes as input the secret key sk, a sequence of
documents d1, . . . , dol(κ), history hist and outputs a message m
′.
The following properties are essential for stegosystems PKStS with output length
ℓ = PKStS.ol(κ). It is universal (black box ), if it works on every channel without
3 We will drop the prefix PKStS if the context is clear.
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prior knowledge of the probability distribution of the channel. Clearly channels
with too small min-entropy (such as deterministic channels) are not suitable for
steganographic purposes. We thus concentrate only on channels with sufficiently
large min-entropy.
The system is reliable if the probability that the decoding fails is bounded
by a negligible function. Formally, the unreliability UnRelPKStS,C(κ) is defined
as probability that the decoding fails, i. e.
max
m,hist
{ Pr
(pk,sk)←PKStS.Gen(1κ)
[PKStS.Dec(sk,PKStS.EncC(pk,m, hist), hist) 6= m]}.
The system PKStS is secure, if every polynomial attacker W (the warden)
has only negligible success probability. W works in two phases: In the first phase
(called W.Find), the warden has access to the channel C and to a decoding or-
acle Decsk(·), that returns upon input d1, . . . , dℓ and hist the same result as
PKStS.Dec(sk, (d1, . . . , dℓ), hist). At the end of the first phase, the warden chooses
a message m∗ and a history hist∗.
At the beginning of the second phase (called W.Guess), the warden gets a
sequence of documents d∗ = d∗1, . . . , d
∗
ℓ , which is with probability of 50% the
result of PKStS.EncC(pk,m∗, hist∗) and with probability of 50% just the result of
sampling ℓ random documents from Chist∗,n, which we denote as C
ℓ
hist∗,n. Speaking
more precisely, this sampling is done as follows: d∗i ← Chist∗||d∗1||...||d∗i−1,n for
i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Next, the warden should distinguish between these two cases by
having access to another decoding oracle. Depending on the oracle type, two
definitions for security were proposed by Backes and Cachin in [3].
In the SS-CCA-model (chosen covertext attack), the decoding oracle, denoted
as Decsk,d∗(·), works like Decsk(·) on every input different from d∗. If Decsk,d∗(·)
is called with input d∗, it simply returns ⊥. In the weaker SS-RCCA-model (re-
stricted chosen ciphertext attack), the decoding oracle, denoted as Decsk,d∗,m∗(·),
works like Decsk(·) on most inputs: If the input d equals d∗ or is a valid encoding
of m∗ (a replay of d∗), the oracle simply returns ⊥.
Formally, SS-CCA-security is defined by the SS-CCA-security game given be-
low and the advantage of W = [W.Find,W.Guess] is defined as
Adv
ss-cca
W,PKStS,C(κ) =
∣∣Pr[SS-CCA-Dist(W,PKStS, C, κ) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣.
SS-CCA-security game: SS-CCA-Dist(W,PKStS, C, κ)
Input: warden W, stegosystem PKStS, channel C, security parameter κ
1: (pk, sk) ← PKStS.Gen(1κ); (m∗, hist∗, s) ← W.FindDecsk,C(pk)
2: b← {0, 1}
3: if b = 0 then d∗ ← PKStS.EncC(pk,m∗, hist∗) else d∗ ← Cℓhist∗,n
4: b′ ← W.GuessDecsk,d∗ ,C(pk,m∗, hist∗, s,d∗)
5: if b′ = b then return 1 else return 0
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A stegosystem PKStS is called SS-CCA-secure against channel C if for some
negligible function negl and all wardens W, we have Advss-ccaW,PKStS,C(κ) ≤ negl(κ).
We define SS-RCCA-security analogously, where the Guess phase uses Decsk,d∗,m∗
as decoding oracle. Formally, a stegosystem is universally SS-CCA-secure (or just
universal), if it is SS-CCA-secure against all channels of sufficiently large (i. e.
super-logarithmic in κ) min-entropy.
Cryptographic Primitives. Due to space constraints, we only give informal
definitions of the used cryptographic primitives and refer the reader to the text-
book of Katz and Lindell [24] for complete definitions.
We will make use of different cryptographic primitives, namely hash func-
tions, pseudorandom permutations and CCA-secure cryptosystems. A collision-
resistant hash function (CRHF) H = (H.Gen,H.Eval) is a pair of PPTMs such
that H.Gen upon input 1κ produces a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ. The keyed function H.Eval
takes the key k ← H.Gen(1κ) and a string x ∈ {0, 1}H.in(κ) and produces a string
H.Evalk(x) of length H.out(κ) < H.in(κ). The probability of every PPTM Fi to
find a collision – two strings x 6= x′ such that H.Evalk(x) = H.Evalk(x′) – upon
random choice of k is negligible. For a set X , denote by Perms(X) the set of all
permutations on X . A pseudorandom permutation (PRP) P = (P.Gen,P.Eval) is
a pair of PPTMs such that P.Gen upon input 1κ produces a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ. The
keyed function P.Eval takes the key k ← P.Gen(1κ) and is a permutation on the
set {0, 1}P.in(κ). An attacker Dist (the distinguisher) is given black-box access
to P և Perms({0, 1}P.in(κ)) or to P.Evalk for a randomly chosen k and should
distinguish between those scenarios. The success probability of every Dist is neg-
ligible. A public key encryption scheme (PKES) PKES = (PKES.Gen,PKES.Enc,
PKES.Dec) is a triple of PPTMs such that PKES.Gen(1κ) produces a pair of keys
(pk, sk) with |pk| = κ and |sk| = κ. The key pk is called the public key and the key
sk is called the secret key (or private key). The encryption algorithm PKES.Enc
takes as input pk and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}PKES.ml(κ) of length PKES.ml(κ) and
outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}PKES.cl(κ) of length PKES.cl(κ). The decryption
algorithm PKES.Dec takes as input sk and the ciphertext c and produces a plain-
text m ∈ {0, 1}PKES.ml(κ). Informally, we will allow an attacker A to first choose
a message m∗ that should be encrypted and denote this by A.Find. In the next
step (A.Guess), the attacker gets c∗, which is either Enc(pk,m∗) or a random
bitstring. He is allowed to decrypt ciphertexts different from c∗ and his task is
to distinguish between these two cases. This security notion is known as security
against chosen-ciphertext$ attacks (CCA$s). For an attacker A on cryptographic
primitive Π ∈ {hash, prp, pkes} with implementation X , we write AdvΠA,X,C(κ)
for the success probability of A against X relative to channel C, i. e. the attacker
A also has access to a sampling oracle of C. In case of encryption schemes, the
superscript cca$ is used instead of pkes.
Due to the works [16,18,31,34] we know that CCA$-secure cryptosystems and
PRPs can be constructed from doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations resp. one-
way functions, while CRHFs can not be constructed from them in a black-box
way, as Simon showed an oracle-separation in [37].
On the Gold Standard for Security of Universal Steganography 9
3 Detecting the Scheme of Backes and Cachin
In order to understand the difference between SS-CCA-security and the closely
related, but weaker, SS-RCCA-security, we give a short presentation of the uni-
versal SS-RCCA-stegosystem of Backes and Cachin [3]. We also show that their
system is not SS-CCA-secure, which was already noted by Hopper in [21]. The
proof of insecurity nicely illustrates the difference between the security models.
It also highlights the main difficulty of SS-CCA-security: One needs to prevent
so called replay attacks, where the warden constructs upon stegotext c another
stegotext c′ – the replay of c – that embeds the same message as c.
Backes and Cachin [3] showed that there is a universal SS-RCCA-secure
stegosystem under the assumption that a replayable chosen-covertext$ attack
(RCCA$)-secure cryptosystem exists.4 They make use of a technique called re-
jection sampling. Let {Gκ}κ∈N be a strongly 2-universal hash function family,
f ∈ Gκ a function, C be a channel, hist be a history and b ∈ {0, 1} be a
bit. The algorithm rejsam(f, C, b, hist) samples documents d ← Chist,dl(κ) until
it finds a document d∗ such that f(d∗) = b or until it has sampled κ docu-
ments. If PKES is an RCCA$-secure cryptosystem, they define a stegosystem that
computes (b1, . . . , bℓ) ← PKES.Enc(pk,m) and then sends d1, d2, . . . , dℓ, where
di ← rejsam(f, C, bi, hist ||d1|| . . . ||di−1). The function f ∈ Gκ is also part of the
public key. The system is universal as it does not assume any knowledge on C.
They then prove that this stegosystem is SS-RCCA-secure. And indeed, one
can show that their stegosystem is not SS-CCA-secure by constructing a generic
warden W that works as follows: The first phase W.Find chooses as message
m∗ = 00 · · ·0 and as hist∗ the empty history ∅. The second phase W.Guess gets
d
∗ = d∗1, . . . , d
∗
ℓ which is either a sequence of random documents or the output
of the stegosystem on pk, m∗, and hist∗. The warden W now computes another
document d′ via rejection sampling that embedds f(d∗ℓ ) (the replay of d
∗) and
decodes d∗1, . . . , d
∗
ℓ−1, d
′ via the decoder of the rejection sampling stegosystem. It
then returns 0 if the returned message m′ consists only of zeroes. If d∗ was a
sequence of random documents, it is highly unlikely that d∗ decodes to a message
that only consists of zeroes. If d∗ was produced by the stegosystem, the decoder
only returns something different from the all-zero-message if d′ = d∗ℓ which is
highly unlikely. The warden W has advantage of 1−negl(κ) and the stegosystem
is thus not SS-CCA-secure. Backes and Cachin posed the question whether a
universal SS-CCA-secure stegosystem exists.
4 An High-Level View of our Stegosystem
The stegosystem of Backes and Cachin only achieves SS-RCCA-security as a sin-
gle ciphertext has many different possible encodings in terms of the documents
used. Hopper achieves SS-CCA-security by limiting those encodings: Due to the
4 The definition of a RCCA$-secure cryptosystem is analogous to SS-RCCA-security
given in Section 2.
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sampleability of the channel, each ciphertext has exactly one deterministic encod-
ing in terms of the documents. While Hopper achieves SS-CCA-security, he needs
to give up the universality of the stegosystem, as a description of the channel is
hard-wired into the stegosystem. In order to handle as many channels as possi-
ble, we will allow many different encodings of the same ciphertext, but make it
hard to find them for anyone but the stegoencoder. To simplify the presentation,
we focus on the case of embedding a single bit per document. Straightforward
modifications allow embedding of log(κ) bits.
Our stegosystem, named PKStS∗ will use the following approach to encode a
messagem: It first samples, for sufficiently largeN , a set D of N documents from
the channel C and uses a strongly 2-universal hash function f ∈ Gκ to split these
documents into documents D0 that encode bit 0 (i. e. D0 = {d ∈ D | f(d) = 0})
and D1 that encode bit 1 (i. e. D1 = {d ∈ D | f(d) = 1}). Now we encrypt the
message m via a certain public-key encryption system, named PKES* (described
in the next section), and obtain a ciphertext b = b1, . . . , bL of length L = ⌊N/8⌋.
Next our goal is to order the documents inD into a sequence d = d1, . . . , dN such
that the first L documents d1, . . . , dL encode b (i. e. f(d)i = bi). This ordering
is performed by the algorithm generate. However, the attacker still has several
possibilities for a replay attack on this scheme, for example:
– He could exchange some document di by another document d
′
i with f(di) =
f(d′i) (as f is publicly known) and the sequence d1, . . . , di−1, d
′
i, di+1, . . . , dN
would be a replay of d. Such attacks will be called sampling attacks. To
prevent the attacker from exchanging a sampled document by a non-sampled
one, we also encode a hash-value of all sampled documents D and transmit
this hash value to Bob.
– The attacker can exchange documents di and dj , with i < j and f(di) =
f(dj), and the resulting sequence d1, . . . , di−1, dj , di+1, . . . , dj−1, di, dj+1, . . . , dN
would be a replay of d. Such attacks will be called ordering attacks. We thus
need to prevent the attacker from exchanging the positions of sampled doc-
uments. We achieve this by making sure that the ordering of the documents
generated by generate is deterministic, i. e. for each set of documents D and
each ciphertext b, the ordering d generated by generate is deterministic. This
property is achieved by using PRPs to sort the sampled documents D. The
corresponding keys of the PRPs are also transmitted to Bob and the stegode-
coder can thus also compute this deterministic ordering.
In total, our stegoencoder PKStS∗.Enc works on a secret message m and on a
publicly known hash-function f as follows:
1. Sample N documents D from the channel;
2. Get a hash-key kH and compute a hash-value h = H.EvalkH(lex(D)) of the
sampled documents, where lex(D) denotes the sequence of elements of D
in lexicographic order. This prevents sampling attacks, where a sampled
document is replaced by a non-sampled one;
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3. Get two5 PRP-keys kP and k
′
P that will be used to determine the unique
ordering of the documents in D via generate. This prevents ordering attacks,
where the order of the sampled documents is switched;
4. Encrypt the concatenation of m, kH, kP, k
′
P, h via a certain public key en-
cryption scheme PKES* and obtain the ciphertext b of length L = ⌊N/8⌋.
As long as PKES* is secure, the stegodecoder is thus able to verify whether
all sampled documents were sent and can also verify the ordering of the
documents.
5. Compute the ordering d of the documents D via generate that uses the PRP
keys kP and k
′
P to determine the ordering of the documents. It also uses
the ciphertext b to guarantee that the first L send documents encode the
ciphertext b, i. e. b1 . . . bL = f(d1) . . . f(dL);
6. Send the ordering of the documents d.
To decode a sequence of documents d = d1, . . . , dN , the stegodecoder of
PKStS∗ computes the ciphertext b1 = f(d1), . . . , bL = f(dL) encoded in the first
L documents of d. It then decodes this ciphertext b1 . . . bL via PKES
* to obtain
the message m, the PRP keys kP and k
′
P, the hash-key kH and the hash-value h.
First it verifies the hash-value by checking whether H.EvalkH(lex({d1, . . . , dN}))
equals the hash-value h to prevent sampling attacks. It then uses the PRP keys
kP and k
′
P′ to compute an ordering of the received documents via generate to
verify that no ordering attack was used. If these validations are successful, the
decoder PKStS∗.Dec returns m; Otherwise, it concludes that d is not a valid
stegotext and returns ⊥.
Intuitively, it is clear that a successful sampling attack on this scheme would
break the collision-resistant hash function H, as it needs to create a collision
of lex(D) in order to pass the first verification step. Furthermore, a successful
ordering attack would need manipulate the ciphertext b and thus break the
security of the public key encryption scheme PKES*, as the PRP keys kP and k
′
P
guarantee a deterministic ordering of the documents.
As explained above, our stegoencoder computes the ordering d = d1, . . . , dN
of the documents D = {d1, . . . , dN} via the deterministic algorithm generate,
that is given the following parameters: the set of documents D, the hash-function
f and the ciphertext b to ensure that the first documents of the ordering encode
b. It has furthermore access to the PRP keys kP and k
′
P that guarantee a deter-
ministic ordering of the documents in D and thus prevents ordering attacks. As
the ordering d produced by generate is sent by the stegoencoder, this ordering
must be indistinguishable from a random permutation on D (which equals the
channel distribution) in order to be undetectable. As f(d1) = b1, . . . , f(dL) = bL,
not every distribution upon the ciphertext b can be used to guarantee that d
is indistinguishable from a uniformly random permutation. This indistinguisha-
bility is guaranteed by requiring that the ciphertext b is distributed according
to a certain distribution corresponding to a random process modeled by draw-
ing black and white balls from an urn without replacement. In our setting, the
5 We believe that one permutation suffices. But in order to improve the readability of
the proof for security, we use two permutations in our stegosystem.
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documents in D will play the role of the balls and the coloring is given by the
function f .
Section 5 describes this random process in detail and proves that we can
indeed construct a public-key encryption system that produces ciphertexts that
are indistinguishable from this process. Section 6 contains a formal description
of generate, proves that no attacker can produce a replay of its output and
shows that the generated permutation is indeed indistinguishable from a ran-
dom permutation. Finally, Section 7 contains the complete description of the
stegosystem.
5 Obtaining Biased Ciphertexts
We will now describe a probability distribution and show how one can derive a
symmetric encryption scheme with ciphertexts that are indistinguishable from
this distribution. In order to do this, we first define a channel that represents the
required probability distribution together with appropriate parameters, use The-
orem 3 to derive a stegosystem for this channel, and finally derive a cryptosystem
from this stegosystem.
Based upon a CCA$-secure public-key cryptosystem PKES, Hopper [21] con-
structs for every efficiently sampleable channel C an SS-CCA-secure stegosystem
PKStSC by “derandomizing” the rejection sampling algorithm. The only require-
ment upon the channel C is the existence of the efficient sampling algorithm and
that the stegoencoder and the stegodecoder use the same sampling algorithm.
Importantly, due to the efficient sampleability of C, the encoder of PKStSC does
not need an access to the sample oracle. Thus, we get the following result.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 in [21]). If C is an efficiently sampleable channel and
PKES is a CCA$-secure public-key cryptosystem (which can be constructed from
doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations6) then there is a stegosystem PKStSC
(without an access to the sample oracle) such that for all wardens W there is a
negligible function negl such that
Adv
ss-cca
W,PKStSC,C(κ) ≤ negl(κ) + 2
−H∞(C,κ)/2.
Note that the system PKStSC is guaranteed to be secure (under the assump-
tion that CCA$-secure public-key cryptosystems exist), if the channel C is effi-
ciently sampleable and has min-entropy ω(log κ). We call such a channel suitable.
The probability distribution for the ciphertexts we are interested in is the
distribution for the bitstrings b we announced in the the previous section. As we
will see later, the required probability can be described equivalently as follows:
– We are given N elements: N0 of them are labeled with 0 and the remaining
N −N0 elements are labeled with 1.
– We draw randomly a sequence of K elements from the set (drawing without
replacements) and look at the generated bitstring b = b1 . . . bK of length K
determined by the labels of the elements.
6 See e. g. the work [18] of Goldreich and Rothblum.
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We will assume that there are enough elements of both types, i. e. that N0 ≥
K andN−N0 ≥ K. The resulting probability distribution, denoted asD*(N,N0,K),
upon bitstrings of length K is then given as
Pr[D*(N,N0,K) = b1 . . . bK ] =
1(
K
|b|0
) ·
(
N0
|b|0
)
·
(
N−N0
K−|b|0
)
(
N
K
) =
(K−1∏
j=0
1
N − j
)
·
(|b|0−1∏
j=0
[N0 − j]
)
·
(|b|1−1∏
j=0
[N −N0 − j]
)
,
(1)
where |b|0 denotes the number of zero bits in b = b1, . . . , bK and |b|1 the number
of one bits in b. Note that the distribution on the number of zeroes within such
bitstrings is a hypergeometric distribution with parameters N , N0, and K.
Now we will construct a channel C* upon key parameter κ with document
length n = dl(κ) = κ. In the definition below, bin(x)y denotes the binary repre-
sentation of length exactly y for the integer x.
– For the empty history ∅, let C*∅,κ be the uniform distribution on all strings
bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋ that range over all positive integers N,N0 ≤ 2
⌊κ/2⌋
such that N ≥ 8κ and 1/3 ≤ N0/N ≤ 2/3 (in our construction we need
initially a stronger condition than just N0 ≥ κ and N −N0 ≥ κ).
– If the history is of the form hist′ = bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋ hist for some
hist ∈ {0, 1}∗ then we consider two cases: if | hist | ≤ 18N then the distribution
C*hist′,κ equals D
*
(N−| hist |,N0−| hist |0,κ)
; Otherwise, i. e. if | hist | > 18N then
C*hist′,κ equals the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
κ.
It is easy to see that the min-entropy H∞(C
*, n) = minhist′{H∞(C
*
hist′,n)} of
the channel C* is obtained for the history hist′ = bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋ hist,
with 8κ ≤ N ≤ 2⌊κ/2⌋ and such that (i) N0 =
1
3N and hist = 00 . . . 0 of length
1
8N−κ or (ii) N0 =
2
3N and hist = 11 . . . 1 of length
1
8N−κ. In the first case we
get that the min-entropy of the distribution C*hist′,n is achieved on the bitstring
11 . . .1 of length κ and in the second case on 00 . . .0 of length κ. By Eq. (1) the
probabilities to get such strings are equal to each other and, since κ ≤ N/8, they
can be estimated as follows:
κ−1∏
j=0
2N/3− j
7N/8− κ− j
≤
(
2N/3
7N/8− κ
)κ
≤
(
2N/3
6N/8
)κ
= (8/9)κ.
Thus, we get that H∞(C
*, n) ≥ κ log(9/8).
Moreover one can efficiently simulate the choice of N,N0, the sampling pro-
cess of D*(N,N0,κ) and the uniform sampling in {0, 1}
κ. Therefore we can conclude
Lemma 4. The channel C* is suitable, i. e. it is efficiently sampleable and has
min-entropy ω(log κ). Furthermore, for history hist = bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋,
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with 8κ ≤ N ≤ 2⌈κ/2⌉ and 1/3 ≤ N0/N ≤ 2/3, and for any integer ℓ ≤
N
8κ , the
bitstrings b = b1 . . . bK of length K = κ · ℓ ≤ N/8 obtained by the concatenation
of ℓ consecutive documents sampled from the channel with history hist, i. e. bi ←
C*hist b1...bi−1,n=κ, have distribution D
*
(N,N0,K)
.
A proof for the second statement of the lemma follows directly from the
construction of the channel. Now, combining the first claim of the lemma with
Theorem 3 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 5. If doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations exists, there is a stegosys-
tem PKStSC* (without an access to the sample oracle) such that for all wardens
W there is a negligible function negl such that Advss-ccaW,PKStS
C*
,C*(κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Based upon this stegosystem PKStS = PKStSC* , we construct a public-key
cryptosystem PKES*, with ciphertexts of length PKES*.cl(κ) = κ · PKStS.cl(κ)
such that PKES* also has another algorithm, called PKES*.Setup that takes pa-
rameters: two integers N and N0 which satisfy 8 · PKES
*.cl(κ) ≤ N ≤ 2⌊κ/2⌋
and N0/N ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. Calling PKES
*.Setup(N,N0) stores the values N,N0 such
that PKES*.Enc and PKES*.Dec can use them.
– The key generation PKES*.Gen simply equals the key generation algorithm
PKStS.Gen.
– The encoding algorithm PKES*.Enc takes as parameters the public key pk and
a message m. It then simulates the encoder PKStS.Enc on key pk, message
m and history hist = bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋ and produces a bitstring of
length PKES*.cl(κ) = PKStS.ol(κ) · κ.
– The decoder PKES*.Dec simply inverts this process by simulating the ste-
godecoder PKStS.Dec on key sk and history hist = bin(N)⌈κ/2⌉ bin(N0)⌊κ/2⌋.
Clearly, the ciphertexts of PKES*.Enc(pk,m) are indistinguishable from the
distribution D*
(N,N0,PKES*.cl(κ))
by the second statement of Lemma 4. This gener-
alization of Theorem 3 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 6. If doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations exist, there is a secure
public-key cryptosystem PKES*, equipped with the algorithm PKES*.Setup that
takes two parameters N and N0, such that its ciphertexts are indistinguishable
from the probability distribution D*
(N,N0,PKES*.cl(κ)))
whenever N and N0 satisfy
that 8 · PKES*.cl(κ) ≤ N ≤ 2⌊κ/2⌋ and N0/N ∈ [1/3, 2/3].
6 Ordering the Documents
As described before, to prevent replay attacks, we need to order the sampled doc-
uments. This is done via the algorithm generate described in this section. To im-
prove the readability, we will abbreviate some terms and define L = PKES*.cl(κ)
and n = PKStS∗.dl(κ), where PKES*
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the last section and PKStS∗ is our target stegosystem that we will provide later
on. We also define N = 8L.
To order the set of documents D ⊆ Σn, we use the algorithm generate,
presented below. It takes the set of documents D with |D| = N , a hash function
f : Σn → {0, 1} from Gκ, a bitstring b1, . . . , bL, and two keys kP, k
′
P for PRPs. It
then uses the PRPs to find the right order of the documents.
Algorithm: generate(D, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P)
Input: set D with |D| = N , hash function f , bits b1, . . . , bL, PRP-keys kP, k
′
P
1: let D0 = {d ∈ D | f(d) = 0} and D1 = {d ∈ D | f(d) = 1} ⊲ We assert
that |D| = N , and furthermore |D0| ∈ [N/3, 2N/3]
2: for i = 1 to L do
3: di := argmind∈Dbi {P.EvalkP(d)}; Dbi := Dbi \ {di}
4: let D′ = D0 ∪D1 ⊲ collect remaining documents
5: for i = L+ 1, . . . , N do
6: di := argmind∈D′{P.Evalk′
P
(d)}; D′ := D′ \ {di}
7: return d1, d2, . . . , dN
Note that the permutation P.EvalkP is a permutation upon the set {0, 1}
n
(i. e. on the documents themselves) and the canonical ordering of {0, 1}n thus
implicitly gives us an ordering of the documents.
We note the following important property of generate that shows where the
urn model of the previous section comes into play. For uniform random permu-
tations P and P ′, we denote by generate(· · · , P, P ′) the run of generate, where
the use of P.EvalkP is replaced by P and the use of P.Evalk′P is replaced by P
′.
If the bits b = b1, . . . , bL are distributed according to D
*
(N,|D0|,L)
, the resulting
distribution on the documents then equals the channel distribution.
Lemma 7. Let C be any memoryless channel, f be some hash function and
D be a set of N = 8L documents of C such that N/3 ≤ |D0| ≤ 2N/3, where
D0 = {d ∈ D | f(d) = 0}. If the permutations P, P ′ are uniformly random and
the bitstring b = b1, . . . , bL is distributed according to D
*
(N,|D0|,L)
, the output of
generate(D, f, b, P, P ′) is a uniformly random permutation of D.
Proof. Fix any document set D of size N = 8L and a function f that splits
D into D0∪˙D1, with |D0| ≥ N/3 and |D1| ≥ N/3. Let dˆ = dˆ1, . . . , dˆN be
any permutation on D. We will prove that the probability (upon bits b and
permutations P , P ′) that dˆ is produced, is 1/N ! and thus establish the re-
sult. Let d = d1, . . . , dN be the random variables that denote the outcome of
generate(D, f, b1, . . . , bL, P, P
′).
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Note that if d[i] (resp. dˆ[i]) denotes the prefix of length i of d (resp. dˆ), then
using the chain rule formula we get
Pr
b,P,P ′
[d1d2 . . . dN = dˆ1dˆ2 . . . dˆN ] =
N∏
i=1
Pr
b,P,P ′
[di = dˆi | d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1]].
To estimate each of the factors of the product, we consider two cases:
– Case i ≤ L: Let bˆ = bˆ1, . . . , bˆL be the bitstring such that bˆi = f(dˆi) and
let bˆ[i] be the prefix bˆ1, . . . , bˆi of bˆ of length i. Clearly, for i ≤ L it holds
that the event di = dˆi under the condition d[i − 1] = dˆ[i − 1] occurs iff
(A) di ∈ Dbˆi and (B) di is put on position |bˆ[i]|bˆi by the permutation P
with respect to Dbˆi . Due to the distribution of bit bi in the random bits b,
the event di ∈ Dbˆi occurs with probability (|Dbˆi | − |bˆ[i − 1]|bˆi)/(N − i + 1)
(under the above condition). As d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1] holds, exactly |bˆ[i− 1]|bˆi
documents from Dbˆi are already used in the output. As P is a uniform
random permutation, the probability that di is put on position |bˆ[i]|bˆi by
the permutation P (with respect to Dbˆi) is thus 1/(|Dbˆi|− |bˆ[i− 1]|bˆi). Since
(A) and (B) are independent, we conclude for i ≤ L that the probability
Prb,P,P ′ [di = dˆi | d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1]] is equal to
Prb[di ∈ Dbˆi | d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1]] ×
PrP [P puts di on position |bˆ[i]|bˆi | d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1]] =
|Dbˆi | − |bˆ[i− 1]|bˆi
N − i+ 1
·
1
|Dbˆi | − |bˆ[i− 1]|bˆi
=
1
N − i+ 1
.
– Case i > L: As the choice of P ′ is independent from the choice of P , the
remaining 2L items are ordered completely random. Hence, for i > L we
also have
Pr
b,P,P ′
[di = dˆi | d[i− 1] = dˆ[i− 1]] =
1
N − i+ 1
.
Putting it together, we get
Pr
b,P,P ′
[d1d2 . . . dN = dˆ1dˆ2 . . . dˆN ] =
N∏
i=1
1
N − i+ 1
=
1
N !
. ⊓⊔
As explained above, a second property that we need is that no attacker should
be able to produce a “replay” of the output of generate. Below, we formalize this
notion and analyze the security of the algorithm. An attacker A on generate is a
PPTM, that receives nearly the same input as generate: a set D of N documents,
a hash function f : Σn → {0, 1} from the family Gκ, a sequence b1, . . . , bL of L
bits, and a key kH for the CRHF H. Then A outputs a sequence d
′
1, . . . , d
′
N of
documents. We say that the algorithm A is successful if
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1. f(di) = f(d
′
i) for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
2. d′1, . . . , d
′
N = generate(D
′, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), and
3. H.EvalkH(lex(D
′)) = H.EvalkH(lex(D)),
where D′ denotes the set {d′1, . . . , d
′
N} and, recall, lex(X) denotes the sequence
of elements of set X in lexicographic order. We can then conclude the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 (Informal). Let D ⊆ Σn be a set of documents with |D| = N , let
b1, . . . , bL be a bitstring, and f ∈ Gκ. For every attacker A on generate, there is
a collision finder Fi for the CRHF H such that the probability that A is successful
on D, f, b1, . . . , bL, kH is bounded by Adv
hash
Fi,H,C(κ).
The formal definition of “A is successful” as well as a formal statement of the
lemma can be found in the Appendix, Section A.
7 The Steganographic Protocol PKStS∗
We now have all of the ingredients of our stegosystem, namely the CCA-secure
cryptosystem PKES* from Section 5 and the ordering algorithm generate from
Section 6. To improve the readability, we will abbreviate some terms and define
n = PKStS∗.dl(κ), ℓ = PKStS∗.ol(κ), and L = PKES*.cl(κ), where PKES* is the
public-key encryption scheme from Section 5 and PKStS∗ is the stegosystem that
we will define in this section. We also let N = 8L.
In the following, let C be a memoryless channel, P be a PRP relative to C, H be
a CRHF relative to C and G = {Gκ}κ∈N be a strongly 2-universal hash family. Re-
member, that PKES* has the algorithm PKES*.Setup that takes the additional pa-
rameters N,N0 ≤ 2⌈κ/2⌉, such that if N ≥ 8 ·PKES
*.cl(κ) and N0/N ∈ [1/3, 2/3]
then the output of PKES*.Enc(pk,m) is indistinguishable from D*
(N,N0,PKES*.cl(κ))
(see Section 5 for a discussion). Furthermore, we assume that PKES* has very
sparse support, i. e. the ratio of valid ciphertexts compared to {0, 1}PKES
*.cl(κ) is
negligible: If PKES*.Enc(pk,m) is called, we first use some public key encryption
scheme PKES with very sparse support to compute c ← PKES.Enc(pk,m) and
then encrypt c via PKES*. This construction is due to Lindell [29] and also main-
tains the indistinguishability of the output of PKES*.Enc and the distribution D*,
as this properties hold for all fixed messagesm. Now we are ready to provide our
stegosystem named PKStS∗. Its main core is the ordering algorithm generate.
– The key generating PKStS∗.Gen queries PKES*.Gen for a key-pair (pk, sk) and
chooses a hash-function f և Gκ. The public key of the stegosystem will be
pk∗ = (pk, f) and the secret key will be sk∗ = (sk, f).
– The encoding algorithm PKStS∗.Enc presented below (as Cn is memoryless
we skip hist in the description) works as described in Section 4: It chooses
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appropriate keys, samples documents D, computes a hash value of D, gen-
erates bitstring b via PKES*, and finally orders the documents via generate.
7
– To decode a sequence of documents d1, . . . , dN , the stegodecoder PKStS
∗.Dec
first computes the bit string b1 = f(d1), . . . , bN = f(dN ) and computes the
number N0 = |{di : f(di) = 0}|. In case |{d1, . . . , dN}| < N or N0/N 6∈
[1/3, 2/3], the decoder PKStS∗.Dec returns ⊥ and halts. Otherwise, using
PKES*.Dec with sk and parameters N,N0, it decrypts from the ciphertext
b1, b2, . . . , bL the message m, the keys kH, kP, k
′
P and the hash-value h. It
then checks whether the hash-value h is correct and whether d1, . . . , dN =
generate({d1, . . . , dN}, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k′P). Only if this is the case, the mes-
sage m is returned. Otherwise, PKStS∗.Dec decides that it can not decode
the documents and returns ⊥.
The steganographic encoder: PKStS∗.Enc(pk∗,m)
Input: public key pk∗ = (pk, f), message m; access to channel Cn
1: let L = PKES*.cl(κ) and N = 8L; let D0 := ∅ and D1 := ∅
2: for j = 1 to N do
3: sample dj from Cn; let Df(dj) := Df(dj) ∪ {dj}
4: N0 = |D0|
5: if |D0 ∪D1| < N or N0/N 6∈ [1/3, 2/3] then return d1, . . . , dN and halt
6: choose hash key kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
7: choose PRP keys kP, k
′
P ← P.Gen(1
κ)
8: let h := H.EvalkH(lex(D0 ∪D1)) ⊲ compute hash
9: call PKES*.Setup(N,N0) ⊲ setup N,N0
10: let b1, b2, . . . , bL ← PKES
*.Enc(pk,m || kH || kP || k
′
P || h)
11: let d := generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P)
12: return d
Proofs of Reliabiliy and Security. We will first concentrate on the reliability
of the system PKStS∗ and prove that its unreliability is negligible. This is due
to the fact, that the decoding always works and the encoding can only fail if
a document was drawn more than once or if the sampled documents are very
imbalanced with regard to f .
Theorem 9. The probability that a message is not correctly embedded by the
encoder PKStS∗.Enc is at most 3N2 · 2−H∞(C,κ) + 2 exp(−N/54).
If 1 < λ ≤ log(κ) bits per document are embedded, this probability is
bounded by 22λ · 3N2 · 2−H∞(C,κ) + 2λ+1 exp(−N/54), which is negligible in κ if
7 That the number of produced documents is always divisible by 8 does not hurt the
security: The warden always gets the same number of documents, whether steganog-
raphy is used or not.
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H∞(C, κ) sufficiently large. Now, it only remains to prove that our construction
is secure. The proof proceeds similar to the security proof of Hopper [21]. But
instead of showing that no other encoding of a message exists, we prove that
finding any other encoding of the message is infeasible via Lemma 8.
Theorem 10. Let C be a memoryless channel, P be a PRP relative to C, the
algorithm H be a CRHF relative to C, the cryptosystem PKES* be the cryptosystem
designed in Section 5 with very sparse support relative to C, and G be a strongly
2-universal hash family. The stegosystem PKStS∗ is SS-CCA-secure against every
memoryless channel.
Proof (Proof sketch). We prove that the above construction is secure via a hybrid
argument. We thus define six distributions H1, . . . , H6 shown in Figure 1.
We now proceed by proving that Hi and Hi+1 are SS-CCA-indistinguishable
(denoted by Hi ∼ Hi+1). Informally, this means that we replace in SS-CCA-Dist
the call to the stegosystem (if b = 0) by Hi and the call to the channel (if
b = 1) by Hi+1. Denote by Adv
(i)
W (κ) the advantage of a warden W in this sit-
uation. Clearly, the SS-CCA-advantage of W is bounded as Advss-ccaW,PKStS∗,C(κ) ≤
Adv
(1)
W (κ)+Adv
(2)
W (κ)+Adv
(3)
W (κ)+Adv
(4)
W (κ)+Adv
(5)
W (κ). This implies the
theorem, as H1 simply describes the channel and H6 describes the stegosystem.
Informally, we argue that:
1. H1 ∼ H2 because a uniform random permutation on a memoryless channel
does not change any probabilities;
2. H2 ∼ H3 because our choice of b1, . . . , bL and random permutations equal
the channel by Lemma 7;
3. H3 ∼ H4 because P is a PRP;
4. H4 ∼ H5 because P is a PRP;
5. H5 ∼ H6 because PKES
* is secure due to Corollary 6 and because of
Lemma 8. ⊓⊔
8 An Impossibility Result
We first describe an argument for truly random channels using an infeasible
assumption and then proceed to modify those channels to get rid of this. All
channels will be 0-memoryless and we thus write Cη,dl instead of Chist,dl, if hist
contains η document.
The main idea of our construction lies on the unpredictability of random
channels. If Cη and Cη+1 are independent and sufficiently random, we can not
deduce anything about Cη+1 before we have sampling access to it, which we only
have after we sent the document of Cη in the standard non-look-ahead model. To
be reliable, there must be enough documents in Cη+1 continuing the already sent
documents (call those documents suitable). To be SS-CCA-secure, the number
of suitable documents in Cη+1 must be very small to prevent replay attacks like
those in Section 3. By replacing the random channels with pseudorandom ones,
we can thus prove that every stegosystem is either unreliable or SS-CCA-insecure
on one of those channels. To improve the readability, fix some stegosystem PKStS
and let n = PKStS.dl(κ) and ℓ = PKStS.ol(κ).
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H1 = C
N
n
1 : pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
2 : for j := 1, 2, . . . , N :
3 : dj ← Cdl(κ)
4 : return ((d1, . . . , dN ), pk
∗)
H2
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : P և Perms
6 : return ((dP (1), . . . , dP (N)), pk
∗)
H3
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : P և Perms;P ′ և Perms; kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL ← D
*
(N,N0,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, P, P
′), pk∗)
/ generate(. . . , P, P ′) uses the permutations P, P ′
H4
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ);P ′ և Perms; kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL և D
*
(N,N0,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, P
′), pk∗)
/ generate(. . . , P ′) uses the permutation P ′
H5
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ); k′P ← P.Gen(1
κ); kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL և D
*
(N,N0,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), pk
∗)
H6 = PKStS
∗.Enc
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ); k′P ← P.Gen(1
κ); kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : h := H.EvalkH(lex(D0 ∪D1))
7 : PKES*.Setup(N,N0)
8 : b1, b2, . . . , bL ← PKES
*.Enc(pk,m || kH || kP || k
′
P || h)
9 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), pk
∗)
Fig. 1. An overview of hybrids H1 and H6 used in the proof of Theorem 10.
Changes between the hybrids are marked as shadowed.
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Lower Bound on Truly Random Channels. For n ∈ N, we denote by Rn
all subsets R of {0, 1}n such that there is a negligible function negl with
– |R| ≥ negl(n)−1 and
– |R| ≤ 2n/2.
This means each subset R has super-polynomial cardinality in n without being
too large. For an infinite sequence R = R0, R1, . . . with Ri ∈ Rn, we construct
a channel C(R) where the distribution C(R)i,n is the uniform distribution on
Ri. The family of all such channels is denoted by F(Rn). We assume that a
warden can test whether a document d belongs to the support of C(R)i,n and
denote this warden by WR. In the next section, we replace the totally random
channels by pseudorandom ones and will get rid of this infeasible assumption.
For a stegosystem PKStS – like the system PKStS∗ from the last section – we
are now interested in two possible events that may occur during the run of
PKStS.Enc on a channel C(R). The first event, denoted by ENq (for Nonqueried),
happens if PKStS.Enc outputs a document it has not seen due to sampling. We
are also interested in the case that PKStS.Enc outputs something in the support
of the channel, denoted by EInS for In Support. Clearly, upon random choice of
R, η (the length of the history), m and pk we have
Pr[EInS | ENq] ≤ ℓ ·
2n/2 − PKStS.query(κ)
2n − PKStS.query(κ)
≤ ℓ · 2−n/2,
where PKStS.query(κ) denotes the number of queries performed by PKStS. This
is negligible in κ as n, query and ℓ are polynomials in κ. As warden WR can test
whether a document belongs to the random sets, we haveAdvss-ccaWR,PKStS,C(R)(κ) ≥
Pr[EInS]. Clearly, since we can assume EInS ⊆ ENq we thus obtain
Pr[ENq] =
Pr[EInS ∧ ENq]
Pr[EInS | ENq]
≤
Adv
ss-cca
WR,PKStS,C(R)(κ)
1− ℓ · 2−n/2
.
Hence, if PKStS is SS-CCA-secure, the term Pr[ENq] must be negligible.
If PKStS is given a history of length η and it outputs documents d1, . . . , dℓ,
we note that PKStS.Enc only gets sampling access to C(R)η+ℓ−1,n after it sent
d1, . . . , dℓ−1 in the standard non-look-ahead model. Clearly, due to the random
choice of R, the set Rη+ℓ is independent of Rη, Rη+1, . . . , Rη+ℓ−1. The encoder
PKStS.Enc thus needs to decide on the documents d1, . . . , dℓ−1 without any
knowledge of Rη+ℓ. As PKStS.Enc draws a sample set D from C(R)η+ℓ−1,n with
at most q = PKStS.query(κ) documents, we now look at the event ENsui (for
Not suitable) that none of the documents in D are suitable for the encoding,
i. e. if the sequence d1, d2, . . . , dℓ−1, d is not a suitable encoding of the message
m for all d ∈ D. Denote the unreliabiliy of the stegosystem by ρ. Clearly, if
ENsui occurs, there are two possibilities for the stegosystem: It either outputs
something from D and thus increases the unreliability or it outputs something it
has not queried. We thus have Pr[ENsui] ≤ max{ρ, (1− ρ) ·Pr[ENq]}. Note that
ρ must be negligible if PKStS.Enc is reliable and, as discussed above, the term
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Pr[ENq] (and thus the term (1 − ρ) · Pr[ENq]) must be negligible if PKStS.Enc is
SS-CCA-secure. Hence, if PKStS.Enc is SS-CCA-secure and reliable, the probabil-
ity Pr[ENsui] must be negligible. The insight, that Pr[ENsui] must be negligible
directly leads us to the construction of a warden WR on the channel C(R). The
warden chooses a random history of length η and a random messagem and sends
those to its challenging oracle. It then receives the document sequence d1, . . . , dℓ.
If di 6∈ Rη+i, the warden returns »Stego«. Else, it samples q documents D from
C(R)η+ℓ,n and tests for all d ∈ D via the decoding oracle PKStS.Decsk if the se-
quence d1, d2, . . . , dℓ−1, d decodes to m. If we find such a d, return »Stego« and
else return »Not Stego«. If the documents are randomly chosen from the chan-
nel, the probability to return »Stego« is at most q/|2PKStS.ml(κ)|, i. e. negligible.
If the documents are chosen by the stegosystem, the probability of »Not Stego«
is exactly Pr[ENsui]. Hence, PKStS must be either unreliable or SS-CCA-insecure
on some channel in F(Rn).
Lower Bound on Pseudorandom Channels. To give a proof, we will replace
the random channels C(R) by pseudorandom ones. The construction assumes
existence of a CCA$-secure cryptosystem PKES with PKES.cl(κ) ≥ 2PKES.ml(κ).
For ω = (pk, sk) ∈ supp(PKES.Gen(1κ)), let C(ω)i,dl(κ) be the distribution
PKES.Enc(pk, bin(i)dl(κ)), where bin(i)dl(κ) is the binary representation of the
number i of length exactly dl(κ) modulo 2dl(κ). The family of channels CPKES =
{C(ω)}ω thus has the following properties:
1. There is a negligible function negl such that for each ω and each i, we have
2PKES.ml(κ)/2 ≥ | C(ω)i,dl(κ)| ≥ negl(κ)
−1 if PKES is CCA$-secure. This follows
easily from the CCA$-security of PKES: If | C(ω)i,dl(κ)| would be polynomial,
an attacker could simply store all corresponding ciphertexts.
2. An algorithm with the knowledge of ω can test in polynomial time, whether
d ∈ supp(C(ω)i,dl(κ)), i. e. whether d belongs to the support by simply testing
whether PKES.Dec(sk, d) equals bin(i)dl(κ).
3. Every algorithm Q that tries to distinguish C(ω) from a random channel
C(R) fails: For every polynomial algorithm Q, we have that the term∣∣ Pr
RևR∗
dl(κ)
[QC(R)(1κ) = 1]− Pr
ω←PKES.Gen(1κ)
[QC(ω)(1κ) = 1]
∣∣
is negligible in κ if PKES is CCA$-secure. This follows from the fact that
no polynomial algorithm can distinguish C(R) upon random choice of R
from the uniform distribution on {0, 1}n, as | C(R)i,n| is super-polynomial.
Furthermore, an attacker A on PKES can simulate Q for a successful attack.
Note that the third property directly implies that no polynomial algorithm
can conclude anything about C(ω)i,dl(κ) from samples of previous distributions
C(ω)0,dl(κ), . . . , C(ω)i−1,dl(κ), except for a negligible term. The second property
directly implies that we can get rid of the infeasible assumption of the previous
section concerning the ability of the warden to test whether a document belongs
to the support of C(ω): We simply equip the warden with the seed ω. Call the
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resulting warden Wω. Note that this results in a non-uniform warden. As above,
we are interested in the events that a stegosystem outputs a document that it
has not seen (E
N̂q
), that a document is outputted which does not belong to the
support (E
ÎnS
) and the event that a random set of q documents is not suitable
to complete a given document prefix d1, d2, . . . , dℓ−1 (EN̂sui).
As E
ÎnS
is a polynomially testable property (due to the second property of
our construction), we can conclude a similar bound as above:
Lemma 11. Let PKStS be an SS-CCA-secure universal stegosystem. For every
warden W and every CCA$-attacker A, Pr[E
N̂q
] ≤
Adv
ss-cca
W,PKStS,C(ω)(κ)
1−ℓ·2−n/2
+AdvpkesA,PKES(κ).
Hence, if the stegosystem PKStS is SS-CCA-secure and PKES is CCA$-secure, the
term Pr[E
N̂q
] must be negligible. As above, we can conclude that Pr[E
N̂sui
] ≤
max{ρ, (1− ρ) · Pr[E
N̂q
]} for unreliabiliy ρ. The warden Wω similar to WR from
the preceding section thus suceeds with very high probability. Hence, no SS-CCA-
secure and reliable stegosystem can exist for the family CPKES:
Theorem 12. If doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations exist, for every stegosys-
tem PKStS in the non-look-ahead model there is a 0-memoryless channel C such
that PKStS is either unreliable or it is not SS-CCA-secure on C against non-
uniform wardens.
9 Discusssion
The work of Dedić et al. [13] shows that provable secure universal steganogra-
phy needs a huge number of sample documents to embed long secret messages
as high bandwidth stegosystems are needed for such messages. This limitation
also transfers to the public-key scenario. However, such a limitation does not
necessarily restrict applicability of steganography, especially in case of specific
communication channels or if the length of secret messages is sufficiently short.
A prominent recent example for such applications is the use of steganography
for channels determined by cryptographic primitives, like symmetric encryption
schemes (SESs) or digital signature schemes. Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway
introduced in [5] so called algorithm substitution attacks against SESs, where
an attacker replaces an honest implementation of the encryption algorithm by
a modified version which allows to extract the secret key from the ciphertexts
produced by the corrupted implementation. Several follow-up works have been
done based on this paper, such as those by Bellare, Jaeger, and Kane [4], Ate-
niese, Magri, and Ventur [2], or Degabriele, Farshim, and Poettering [14]. These
works strengthened the model proposed in [5] and presented new attacks against
SESs or against other cryptographic primitives, e. g. against signature schemes.
Surprisingly, as we show in [6], all such algorithm substitution attacks can be
analyzed in the framework of computational secret-key steganography and in
consequence, the attackers can be identified as stegosystems on certain channels
determined by the primitives. In such scenarios, the secret message embedded
by the stegosystem corresponds to a secret key of the cryptographic algorithm.
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A similar approach was used by Pasquini, Schöttle, and Böhme [35] to show
that so called password decoy vaults used for example by Chatterjee, Bonneau,
Juels, and Ristenpart [10] and Golla, Beuscher, and Dürmuth [19] can also be
interpreted as steganographic protocols.
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A Remaining Proofs
To improve the readability, we will abbreviate some terms and define n =
PKStS∗.dl(κ), ℓ = PKStS∗.ol(κ) and L = PKES*.cl(κ), where PKStS∗ is our
stegosystem constructed in Section 7 and PKES* is the public-key cryptosystem
constructed in Section 5. We also define N = 8L.
A.1 Formal Statement of Lemma 8 and its Proof
We start with a formal definition for “A is successful on D, f, b1, . . . , bL, kH”.
Definition 13. An attacker A on generate is a PPTM, that receives the following
input:
– a sequence d1, . . . , dN of N pairwise different documents
– a hash function f : Σn → {0, 1} from the family G = {Gκ}κ∈N,
– a sequence b1, . . . , bL of L bits, and
– a hash-key kH for H.
The attacker A then outputs a sequence d′1, . . . , d
′
N of documents. Note that the
attacker knows the mapping function f and even the hash-key kH for H.
We say that A is successful if the experiment Sgen(A, D, f, b1, . . . , bL) returns
value 1:
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Security of generate: Sgen(A, D, f, b1, . . . , bL)
Input: Attacker A, set D, function f , bits b1, . . . , bL
1: kP, k
′
P ← P.Gen(1
κ)
2: kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
3: d1, . . . , dN := generate(D, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P)
4: d′1, . . . , d
′
N ← A(d1, . . . , dN , f, b1, . . . , bL, kH)
5: if f(d′i) = bi for every i = 1, . . . L then
6: D′0 = {d
′
j | f(d
′
j) = 0}; D
′
1 = {d
′
j | f(d
′
j) = 1}
7: if d′1, . . . , d
′
N = generate(D
′
0 ∪D
′
1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P) then
8: if H.EvalkH(lex(D
′
0 ∪D
′
1)) = H.EvalkH(lex(D0 ∪D1)) then
9: if d′1, . . . , d
′
N 6= d1, . . . , dN then
10: return 1 and halt
11: return 0
We are now ready to give the formal version of Lemma 8:
Lemma (formal version of Lemma 8). Let D ⊆ Σn be a set of documents,
with |D| = N , let b1, . . . , bL be a bitstring, and f ∈ Gκ. For every attacker A on
generate, there is a collision finder Fi for the CRHF H such that
Pr[Sgen(A, D, f, b1, . . . , bL) = 1] ≤ Adv
hash
Fi,H,C(κ),
where the probability is taken over the random choices made in experiment Sgen.
Proof. Let A be an attacker on generate with maximal success probability. Let
D = D0∪˙D1 be the input to generate, the sequence d1, . . . , dN its output and
d′1, . . . , d
′
N be the output of A. Furthermore, let D
′
b = {d
′
j | f(d
′
j) = b} and
D′ = D′0 ∪ D
′
1. We now distinguish three cases of the relation between D and
D′. If D′ ( D, the sequence d′1, . . . , d
′
N must contain the same element on at
least two positions, but generate does only accept sets of size exactly N . Hence,
A was not successful in this case. If D′ = D and A was successful, it holds that
d′1, . . . , d
′
N 6= d1, . . . , dN . Hence, there must be positions i < j and j
′ < i′ such
that di = di′ and dj = dj′ . As kP and k
′
P define a total order, the sequence
d′1, . . . , d
′
N could not be produced by generate. Thus, A can not be successful in
this case.
The only remaining case is D′ \ D 6= ∅. If A was successful, it holds that
HkH(lex(D
′)) = HkH(lex(D)), i. e. this is a collision with regard to H. We will
now construct a finder Fi for H, such that AdvhashFi,H,C(κ) ≥ Pr[A succeeds]. The
finder Fi receives a hash key kH. It then chooses f և Gκ, samples D documents
of cardinality |D| = N via rejection sampling and PRP-keys kP, k′P. The finder
simulates A and receives
d′1, . . . , d
′
N ← A(generate(D, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), f, b1, . . . , bL, kH).
Then, it returns D and D′ = {d′1, . . . , d
′
N}. Whenever A succeeds, we have
D 6= D′ by the discussion above and thus also HkH(lex(D)) = HkH(lex(D
′)).
Hence, Fi has successfully found a collision. This implies that AdvhashFi,H,C(κ) ≥
Pr[A succeeds]. ⊓⊔
28 S. Berndt and M. Liśkiewicz
A.2 Proof of Theorem 9
Recall the statement of the theorem:
Theorem (Theorem 9). The probability that a message is not correctly em-
bedded by PKStS∗.Enc is at most 3N2 · 2−H∞(C,κ) + 2 exp(−N/54).
Proof. Note that PKStS∗.Enc may not correctly embed a message m if (a) |D0∪
D1| < N i. e. a document sampled in line 3 was drawn twice, or (b) N0/N 6∈
[1/3, 2/3] i. e. the bias is too large, or (c) the number of elements of D0 or D1
is too small to embed b1, b2, . . . , bL by generate. The probability of (a) can be
bounded similar to the birthday attack. It is roughly bounded by 3N2 ·2−H∞(C,κ)
as the probability of every document is bounded by 2−H∞(C,κ).
A simple calculation shows that the probability of (b) and (c) is negligible.
Note that the algorithm always correctly embeds a message, if |D0| ≥ L and
|D1| ≥ L. As N0/N = |D0|/N , this implies that N0/N ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. We will thus
estimate the probability for this. As f is drawn from a strongly 2-universal hash
family, we note that the probability that a random document d is mapped to
1 is equal to 1/2. For i = 1, . . . , N , let Xi be the indicator variable such that
Xi equals 1 if the i-th element drawn from the channel maps to 1. The random
variable X =
∑N
i=1Xi thus has the size of D1. Clearly, its expected value is N/2.
The probability that |X − N/2| > L (and thus |D1| < L or |D0| < L) is hence
bounded by
Pr[|X −N/2| > L] ≤ 2 exp(−
L · (1/3)2
3
) = 2 exp(−N/54)
using a Chernoff-like bound. The probability that the message m is incorrectly
embedded is thus bounded by 2−H∞(C,κ) + 2 exp(−N/54). ⊓⊔
A.3 Proof of Theorem 10
We recall:
Theorem (Theorem 10). Let C be a memoryless channel, P be a PRP relative
to C, the algorithm H be a CRHF relative to C, the cryptosystem PKES* be the
cryptosystem designed in Section 5 with very sparse support relative to C, and G
be a strongly 2-universal hash family. The stegosystem PKStS∗ is SS-CCA-secure
against every memoryless channel.
Proof. We prove that the above construction is secure via a hybrid argument.
We thus define six distributions H1, . . . , H6 shown in Figure 1.
If P and Q are two probability distributions, denote by SS-CCA-DistP,Q the
modification of the game SS-CCA-Dist, where the call to the stegosystem (if b = 0)
is replaced by a call to P and the call to the channel (if b = 1) is replaced by a call
to Q. If W is some warden, denote by Advss-ccaW,P,Q(κ) the winning probability of W
in SS-CCA-DistP,Q. If Adv
ss-cca
W,P,Q(κ) ≤ negl(κ) for a negligible function negl, we
denote this situation as P ∼ Q and say that P and Q are indistinguishable with
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respect to SS-CCA-Dist. Furthermore, we define Adv
(i)
W (κ) = Adv
ss-cca
W,Hi,Hi+1(κ).
As the term Adv
(i)
W (κ) can also be written as∣∣Pr[W.Guess outputs b′ = 0 | b = 0]− Pr[W.Guess outputs b′ = 0 | b = 1]∣∣,
the triangle inequality implies thatAdvss-ccaW,PKStS∗,C(κ) ≤ Adv
(1)
W (κ)+Adv
(2)
W (κ)+
Adv
(3)
W (κ) +Adv
(4)
W (κ) +Adv
(5)
W (κ).
Informally, we argue that:
1. H1 = H2 =⇒ H1 ∼ H2 because a uniform random permutation on a
memoryless channel does not change any probabilities;
2. H2 = H3 =⇒ H2 ∼ H3 because our choice of b1, . . . , bL and random
permutations equal the channel by Lemma 7;
3. H3 ∼ H4 because P is a PRP;
4. H4 ∼ H5 because P is a PRP;
5. H5 ∼ H6 PKES
* is secure due to Corollary 6 and because of Lemma 8.
Distribution H1 can be specified as follows:
H1 = C
N
n
1 : pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
2 : for j := 1, 2, . . . , N :
3 : dj ← Cdl(κ)
4 : return ((d1, . . . , dN ), pk
∗)
Indistinguishability of H1 and
H2
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : P և Perms
6 : return ((dP (1), . . . , dP (N)), pk
∗)
If |D0∪D1| < N , i. e. a document was sampled twice or |D0|/|D| 6∈ [1/3, 2/3],
the system only outputs the sampled documents. Hence H1 equals H2 in this
case. In the other case, we first permute the items before we output them.
But, as P is a uniform random permutation and the documents are drawn
independently from a memoryless channel, we have
Pr
H1
[d1, . . . , dN are drawn] = Pr
H1
[dP (1), . . . , dP (N) are drawn].
As pk is not used in these hybrids, H1 = H2 follows.
Indistinguishability of H2 and
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H3
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : P և Perms;P ′ և Perms; kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL ← D
*
(N,N0 ,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, P, P
′), pk∗)
/ generate(. . . , P, P ′) uses the permutations P, P ′
If |D0∪D1| < N , i. e. a document was sampled twice or |D0|/|D| 6∈ [1/3, 2/3],
the system only outputs the sampled documents. Hence H2 equals H3 in this
case. If |D0 ∪D1| = N , Lemma 7 shows that H2 equals H3.
Indistinguishability of H3 and
H4
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ);P ′ և Perms; kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL և D
*
(N,N0,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, P
′), pk∗)
/ generate(. . . , P ′) uses the permutation P ′
We will construct a distinguisher Dist on the PRP P with AdvprpDist,P,C(κ) =
Adv
(3)
W (κ). Note that such a distinguisher has access to an oracle that either
corresponds to a truly random permutation or to P.Evalk for a key k ←
P.Gen(1κ).
The PRP-distinguisher Dist simulates the run ofW. It first chooses a key-pair
(pk, sk) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ). It then simulates W. Whenever the warden W
makes a call to its decoding-oracle PKStS∗.Dec, it computes PKStS∗.Dec(sk, ·)
(or ⊥ if necessary). In order to generate the challenge sequence dˆ upon the
messagem, it simulates the run of PKStS∗.Enc and replaces every call to P or
P.EvalkP by a call to its oracle. Similarly, the bits output by PKES
*.Enc(pk,m)
are ignored and replaced by truly random bits distributed according to
D*(N,|D0|,L). If the oracle is a truly random permutation, the simulation yields
exactly H3 and if the oracle equals P.Evalk for a certain key k, the simulation
yields H4. The advantage of Dist is thus exactly Adv
(3)
W (κ). As P is a secure
PRP, this advantage is negligible and H3 and H4 are thus indistinguishable.
Indistinguishability of H4 and
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H5
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ); k′P ← P.Gen(1
κ); kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : b1, b2, . . . , bL և D
*
(N,N0,L)
7 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), pk
∗)
We will construct a distinguisher Dist on the PRP P with AdvprpDist,P,C(κ) =
Adv
(4)
W (κ). Note that such a distinguisher has access to an oracle that either
corresponds to a truly random permutation or to P.Evalk for a key k ←
P.Gen(1κ).
The PRP-distinguisher Dist simulates the run ofW. It first chooses a key-pair
(pk, sk)← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ) and a key kP ← P.Gen(1κ) for the PRP P. It then
simulates W. Whenever the warden W makes a call to its decoding-oracle
PKStS∗.Dec, it computes PKStS∗.Dec(sk, ·) (or ⊥ if necessary). In order to
generate the challenge sequence dˆ upon the message m, it simulates the run
of PKStS∗.Enc and replaces every call to P ′ or P.EvalkP by a call to its ora-
cle. Similarly, the bits output by PKES*.Enc(pk,m) are ignored and replaced
by truly random bits distributed according to D*(N,|D0|,L). If the oracle is a
truly random permutation, the simulation yields exactly H4 and if the oracle
equals P.Evalk for a certain key k, the simulation yields H5. The advantage
of Dist is thus exactly Adv
(4)
W (κ). As P is a secure PRP, this advantage is
negligible and H4 and H5 are thus indistinguishable.
Indistinguishability of H5 and
H6 = PKStS
∗.Enc
pk∗ = (pk, f) ← PKStS∗.Gen(1κ)
Lines 1 to 4 in PKStS∗.Enc
5 : kP ← P.Gen(1
κ); k′P ← P.Gen(1
κ); kH ← H.Gen(1
κ)
6 : h := H.EvalkH(lex(D0 ∪D1))
7 : PKES*.Setup(N,N0)
8 : b1, b2, . . . , bL ← PKES
*.Enc(pk,m || kH || kP || k
′
P || h)
9 : return (generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P), pk
∗)
We construct an attacker A on PKES* such that there is a negligible function
negl withAdvcca
A,PKES*,C(κ)+negl(κ) ≥ Adv
(5)
W (κ). Note that such an attacker
A has access to the decryption-oracle PKES*.Decsk(·).
The attacker A simply simulates W. First, it chooses f և Gκ. Whenever
W uses its decryption-oracle to decrypt d1, . . . , dN , the attacker A simulates
PKStS∗.Dec(d1, . . . , dN ) and uses its own decryption-oracle PKES
*.Decsk(·)
in this. When W outputs the challenge m, the attacker A chooses all of the
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parametersD0, D1, kH, kP, k
′
P as in PKStS
∗.Enc and chooses its own challenge
m˜ := m || kH || kP || k′P || h, where h = H.EvalkH(D0 ∪D1).
The attacker now either receives b← PKES*.Enc(pk, m˜) or L random bits b
from D*(N,|D0|,L) and computes
d1, . . . , dN = generate(D0 ∪D1, f, b1, . . . , bL, kP, k
′
P).
If the bits correspond to PKES*.Enc(pk, m˜), this simulates the stegosystem
and thus H6 perfectly. If the bits are random, this equals H5.
After the challenge is determined, A continues to simulate W. Whenever W
uses its decryption-oracle to decrypt d1, . . . , dN , it behaves as above. There
is now a significant difference to the pre-challenge situation: The attacker
A is not allowed to decrypt the bits b = b1, . . . , bL. Hence, when W tries
to decrypt documents d1, . . . , dN such that f(di) = bi, it has no way to
use its decryption-oracle and must simply return ⊥. Suppose that this sit-
uation arises. Note that the decryption-oracle of W would only return a
message not equal to ⊥ then iff d1, . . . , dN = generate(D0 ∪ D1, f, b, kP, k′P)
and H.EvalkH({d1, . . . , dN}) = h.
If b is a truly random string from D*(N,|D0|,L), the sparsity of PKES
* implies
that the probability that b is a valid encoding is negligible. Hence the prob-
ability that the decryption-oracle of W would return a message not equal
to ⊥ is negligible. It only remains to prove that the probability that the
decryption-oracle of W returns a message not equal to ⊥ is negligible if b
is a valid encryption of a message. But Lemma 8 states just that. We thus
have Advcca
A,PKES*,C(κ) + negl(κ) ≥ Adv
(5)
W (κ). As the system PKES
* is CCA-
secure by Corollary 6, this advantage is negligible. Hence, H5 and H6 are
indistinguishable.
Hence, the stegosystem PKStS* is SS-CCA-secure on C. ⊓⊔
